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I. Introduction
As economic theory shows and experience underlines, inter-
national trade and the specialization associated herewith is
one important source of economic growth, employment creation
and technological innovation in participating countries. In
awareness of this potential for increasing economic prosperity
throughout the world, the architects of the international
trading system, which was to emerge from the ashes of World
War II, envisaged a framework of rules leading to, and securing,
open markets. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), which came into being in 1948, laid down such trade
rules, basically the principles of non-discrimination and
multilateralism in world trade. The aim was not to establish
free trade, without any government intervention. What was
meant is liberal trade, in which governments may interfere,
but using price measures which are transparent and do not
rule out competition (i.e. non-prohibitive tariffs rather
than quantitative restrictions or subsidies). Adherence by
the member countries to the principles of multilateralism and
non-discrimination was expected to give rise to the production
of an international public good: stability and predictability
of trade rules.
This system worked reasonably well up to the early seven-
ties. Tariffs were reduced substantially in successive rounds
of multilateral trade policy negotiations, especially with
regard to manufactured goods. The stimulus to world trade
was, by any historical standard, remarkable indeed: In the
Lecture delivered at the Taiwan Institute of Economic
Research, Taipei, on 21.February 1984.- 2
period 1955-73, world exports of manufactures expanded in
real terms at an average annual rate of 9.2 percent, as
compared to an annual rate of growth of world manufacturing
output of 6.6 percent. This pace of integration not only
allowed the advanced countries to further increase real income.
It also permitted other countries, most spectacularly Japan
and various Asian and Latin American developing countries,
to progress up the scale of economic development."And the
fast expansion of trade made an important contribution to
peaceful relations among societies.
This contrasts sharply with the deterioration which the
global framework for trade has been undergoing during the last
ten years or so. Parallel to the 1973-79 Tokyo Round of
trade policy negotiations under the GATT, which was supposed
to substantially reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers to inter-
national trade and to make the fundamental rules of the world
trading system clearer and more predictable, protectionism has
increased. Even worse, protectionism has become more discrimi-
natory among countries and more selectively tailored to indivi-
2
dual goods or sectors, by-passing GATT's trade rules. By now,
more than one fifth of world trade in manufactures is subjected
to non-tariff restrictions, in some cases covering industrial
branches as a whole (textiles and clothing, iron and steel,
shipbuilding, automobiles, consumer electronics, for instance).
World trade in agriculture is still heavily interfered with
(about three fifths of trade value). Not suprisingly, the rate
of growth of world exports, in real terms, has been declining
in recent years and became negative in 1982 (which had occurred
hitherto only in 1958 and 1975). World exports of manufactures
increased by only 4.5 percent per annum in the period 197 3-82.
The data reported here and subsequently have been calculated
from GATT, International Trade, various years.
2
See B. Balassa, "The New Protectionism and the International
Economy", Journal of World Trade Law, Vol. 12 (1978), pp. 409-
436. - J. Tumlir, "The New Protectionism, Cartels,and the Inter-
national Order", in: R.C. Amacher et al. (eds.), Challenges
to a Liberal International Economic Order (Washington, D.C.:
AEI, 1979), pp. 239-258.- 3 -
This current trend of events is discouraging for at least
two reasons: One is that it describes developments which make
for serious policy-induced uncertainty, adversely affecting
long-term investments and retarding the revitalization of the
world economy. The other reason for being concerned is that
political frictions between countries, which lead to formal
disputes and uncontrollable resentments, are generated; the
current controversies within the European Community (EC),
between the EC and the United States, between these two and
Japan, and between industrial and developing countries are
rooted to some degree in a competitive process of government
protection (including subsidies).
Against this background, I shall address three questions:
First, what are the causes underlying the spread of new
protectionism?
- Second, what are the consequences both for the protectionist
countries themselves and for the world economy as a whole?
Third, what are the prospects for restoring a functioning
world trading system?
II. Causes of Increasing Protectionism
When talking about the causes of increased protectionism
it may be worthwhile to differentiate among countries. To sim-
plify matters, I shall deal first with the socialist countries,
then with the developing countries and thereafter with the
industrial countries (always taken as a group).
The socialist (or centrally-planned) countries have, for
systemic reasons, always been highly protectionist and hence
have not added much to the contemporary disorder of the world- 4 -
trading system. These countries regulate their external trade
bilaterally according to their own plan criteria, to their
availability of convertible currencies or to foreign policy
considerations. Though five of them (Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia) are contracting parties to the
GATT, they all feel that they need not open their market to foreign
suppliers according to the~most-favoured-nation principle; by the
same token they cannot expect as exporters a non-discriminatory
treatment abroad. It should be noticed, however, that faced
with the need to service huge foreign debt at high real rates
of interest several countries (mainly Poland, Hungary and
Yugoslavia) imposed new quantitative restrictions on imports
recently.
2- IS_£he_Developing_Countries
The developing countries (LDCs), whose membership in GATT
has grown from 11 (including the Republic of China) in 1948 to
59 (excluding Mainland China and Taiwan) in 1983 (out of a total
of 90 countries), have also a long tradition in pursuing protec-
tionist trade policies, but for different reasons. Until the
sixties, most LDCs (including present-day newly industrializing
countries or NICs) promoted economic development by policies
of industrialization based on across-the-board import substitu-
tion behind high trade barriers in combination with severe
exchange controls. Comparative cost criteria were deliberately
neglected almost everywhere (the outstanding exceptions were
South Korea and Taiwan) as governments believed that otherwise
a rapid and sustained rate of economic growth at high levels
of employment would not be achieved.
It was only when the escessive emphasis on import substi-
tution, due to the many distortions which it imposed on the
economy, became a serious impasse in the development process
For surveys see B. Balassa, "The Process of Industrial Develop-
ment and Alternative Development Strategies", Princeton Univer-
sity Essays of International Finance, No. 141, December 1980.
- J.B. Donges, "Re-Appraisal of Foreign Trade Strategies for
Industrial Development", in: F. Machlup et al. (eds.), Reflec-
tions on a Troubled World Economy (London: Macmillan, 1983),
pp. 279-301.- 5 -
that development policies became more sensible and outward-
oriented in a growing number of countries up to the mid-
seventies. The most important changes took place with regard
to trade policies: numerous quantitative import.restrictions
were eased, tariffs were lowered and, in some cases (including
Taiwan), free trade zones were established. The more open
framework provided for faster rates of growth and enlarged the
employment opportunities in the countries concerned, in addi-
tion to expanding considerably the potential of manufactured
exports. It should be noted, however, that trade of the now
outward-looking LDCs became liberal mainly by own historical
standards. When compared to OECD countries, the levels of pro-
tection remained high (Hong Kong and Singapore apart). Moreover,
many governments objected to the principle of non-discrimination
and made almost no significant progress in liberalizing trade
among LDCs along the lines of a respective Protocol within the
GATT, which entered into force in 1973.
During the last decade, which was characterized by two
drastic increases of oil prices (in 1973-74 and 1979-80) and
two deep world economic recessions (in 1974-75 and 1980-82)
only a few NICs - most prominently South Korea and Taiwan,
apart from Hong Kong and Singapore - continued to apply outward-
looking policies or, as in the case of Chile, even shifted for
the first time to such policies. The other LDCs responded to
the external shocks either by continuing with import-substitution
strategies or, if they had become more outward-oriented (as
2
Brazil or Israel), by re-imposing restrictions on imports.
See R.J. Langhammer, "Multilateral Trade Liberalization among
Developing Countries", Journal of World Trade Law, Vol. 14
(1980), pp. 508-515. See also 0. Havrylyshyn and M. Wolf,
"Trade among Developing Countries: Theory, Policy Issues and
Principal Trends", World Bank Staff Working Papers, No. 479,
August 1981 .
See B. Balassa, "The Newly-Industrialising Developing Coun-
tries after the Oil Crisis", Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv,
Vol. 117 (1981), pp. 142-194. - J. Cauas and S. de la Cuadra,
"The Economic Policy of Open Trade in Chile", in: L.A. Sjaastad
(ed.), The Free Trade Endeavour-in Latin America (London:
Macmillan, forthcoming).- 6 -
Failures of this approach, manifested by a continuing slow-
ness of economic growth and run-away foreign debt, could
conveniently be attributed to adverse policies of the advanced
countries, including their protectionist measures against the
exports of the Third World.
However distorting trade policies of LDCs (and for that
matter, of the socialist countries) may be, the functioning
of an open and multilateral world trading system is much more
affected by the policies of the industrial countries, in
particular those of the United States, the EC and, increasingly,
Japan. These countries are the pillars of the world economy.
In 1982, together they accounted for 51 percent of total
world exports and for 66 percent of world exports of manufac-
tures; almost half of the world production originated there;
and the share of imports in apparent consumption of manufactured
goods amounted to about 6 percent in Japan, 10 percent in the
United States and 30 percent in the EC. Thus, the major industrial
countries have the responsibility for keeping the global trade
policy environment stable and predictable, irrespective of what
other countries do.
When protectionism by the industrial countries gained momen-
tum ten years ago, it was thought by many to be a temporary
device to solve the balance-of-payments problems which were
caused by the quadruppling of oil prices. But as so often
happens, the "temporary" restrictions have become permanent,
and more severe, in many cases. This lends support to the hypo-
thesis that contemporary protectionism in the industrial world
is far more deeply rooted. Its sources go back into the sixties
and they are related to delays in the adjustment of the industrial
(in particular the Western European) countries to the structural
changes which invariably accompany economic growth because
If trade within the EC were excluded, the shares would still
amount to 40 and 48 percent, respectively.- 7 -
technological progress, the accumulation of physical and
human capital, changes in the supply of labour, changes in
consumer preferences and changes in the international division
of labour all take place at different rates.
In retrospect,market forces seem to have brought about
a considerable amount of structural change. Country-specific
peculiarities apart, the general pattern was in the direction
of shifting away from the production of traditional, relatively
labour-intensive goods (mainly consumer goods) towards the
manufacture of relatively capital-, skill- and research-intensive
goods (mainly investment goods). When Japan and some NICs
emerged vas strong competitors on world markets, many firms
in the United States and the EC reacted successfully with
product and process innovations or transferred production to
locations abroad (mainly LDCs) where unit costs were lower.
But there have also been serious retarding factors
during the sixties. Without going into details, at least
seven troublesome developments should be recalled:
First, labour migration from labour-surplus, capital-poor
North Africa and Southern Europe to Central Europe and
Scandinavia, from several Commonwealth countries to Great
Britain, and from Mexico and the Caribbean Islands to
the United States kept the supply of (unqualified) labour
in the advanced countries excessively elastic.
- Second, effective rates of tariff protection for
labour-intensive activities were kept two to four times
above the average for the manufacturing industry. Partic-
ularly sensitive sectors, such as the textile and clothing
industry, were further sheltered from foreign competition
by quantitative import restrictions (as provided for by
the Long-Term Agreement on Cotton Textiles of 1962).- 8 -
Third, companies facing serious competition from imports
in spite of protection frequently resorted to defensive
investment to render their production, which originally
was relatively labour-intensive, more capital-intensive
and thereby to regain lost comparative advantage. Hence,
a reversal of factor intensities occurred. This reaction
repeats itself at present in connection with the attempt
by trade-impacted firms to substitute microelectronics
and robots for unskilled and expensive labour (particularly
in textiles).
Fourth, expansionary demand-management policies by govern-
ments and the rising inflation associated herewith artifi-
cially depressed real interest rates and thus contributed
to inefficient investment and capital waste. Marginal firms
or industries were required to decline only relatively, rather
than to shrink in absolute terms.
Fifth, countries (such as West Germany) which attached
a higher priority to price level stability than their
major trading partners could,under the post-war Bretton
Woods system of adjustable exchange rates, keep their
currencies undervalued time and again and thus raise
artificially the price competitiveness of their exports
and import-substituteso
Sixth, in the course of creating the modern Welfare State
(particularly in Western Europe) an ever increasing number
of labour market laws and regulations, in addition to
various social components introduced in collective wage
bargaining, led to sticky minimum wages (which became
too high), they unduly narrowed the wage structure (in
spite of existing differences of skills in the labour
force) and they made it unattractive for employees to
change jobs between firms and regions (in order to avoid
losing accumulated benefits).- 9 -
Seventh, the creation of the Welfare State also changed
the attitudes of the people in the sense that the responsi-
bility of the individual for his own economic progress was
replaced by rising expectations about the capacity of govern-
ments to secure full employment at increasing real income
and at a more equal income distribution.
All these developments, coming together, reduced considerably
the flexibility of the advanced economies and the adaptability
of production and employment to structural change. The many
rigidities which were built into the economic system during the
sixties remained largely unnoticed because the national economies
were expanding rapidly. To put it in another way: when the first
oil price crises occurred, most industrial countries had already
lost their previous dynamism because much of the needed structural
adjustment was suppressed. The oil shocks of the seventies, along
with the various recessions and recurrent real appreciations of
some currencies (especially the US dollar relative to the yen),
certainly have exacerbated the difficulties, but a flexible
economy would have been able to adjust successfully (as Japan has
demonstrated). The loss of flexibility in a changing environment,
by contrast, could not but lead to a slowing down of economic
growth and an ever increasing unemployment (as it happened most
persistently in Western Europe since the early seventies). In such
circumstances, sectoral pressures for public assistance arose
almost everywhere and one government after the other, in an
attempt to avoid popular discontent and to stay in power, has
given way to such demands by granting trade protection (inter alia).
Even in West Germany, which is the most important European trading
partner of Taiwan and which for many observers abroad appears
to resemble largely the textbook model of a free-trade economy,
protectionist sentiments and policies have recently gained
ground too - and one explanation may also be derived from the
delay which the process of structural adjustment has suffered
For a neat discussion of these interrelated issues, see L. Dunn
et al., In the Kingdom of the Blind. A Report on Protectionism
and the Asian-Pacific Region (London: Trade Policy Research
Centre, 1983) .in this country.
- 10 -
1
The increasing structural rigidities, in conjunction with
the widespread belief in the omnicompetence of governments,
have been major forces behind the trend towards bilateralism
and sectoralism in trade policy. Old-fashioned tariffs are no
longer important means of keeping imports at bay. As result of
the tariff reductions achieved in the Tokyo Round, the average
level of nominal tariffs on manufactured imports will be 4.4
percent in the United States, 4.7 percent in the EC and 2.8
percent in Japan (to become effective not later than 1 January
1987, through annual cuts which began in 1980). Moreover, the
dispersion of nominal tariff rates will be reduced. Nowadays,
trade restrictions have become a tool of structural policy.
Therefore, they are designed to regulate trade in specific items
by non-price measures and they deliberately discriminate against
the most competitive suppliers from abroad (which in various
cases include Taiwan). The policy variants which seem to best
meet the needs of sunset domestic branches or firms are the
bilaterally negotiated "voluntary" export restraints, the
orderly marketing agreements and the concession of direct
financial aids (mainly subsidies). They all are incompatible
with GATT rules and the Tokyo Round failed to settle them.
2
4. The_Rhetoric_of_Protection
At a conceptual level, there are a number of dangerous mis-
conceptions involved in the ongoing debate in the industrial
countries about the need for protection. To beginn with, govern-
See G. Fels and F. Weiss, "Structural.Change and Employment:
The Lesson of West Germany", in: H. Giersch (ed.), Capital
Shortage and Unemployment in the World Economy (Tubingen:
J.C.B. Mohr, 1978), pp. 31-53.
2
The list of non-tariff measures is much longer, however. See
GATT, Inventory of Non Tariff Measures, Geneva, currently. Some
observers expect that the new "Codes of Conduct" that have been
agreed in the Tokyo Round (on customs valuation, subsidies and
countervailing duties, import licensing procedures, and techni-
cal standards) will make for a reduction of trade-distorting
effects; but their rather vague drafting can lead governments,
if they wish so, to apply the codes in a restrictive manner. A
code on the application of selective safeguards, which originally
was also on the agenda of the negotiations, could not be achieved
due to the opposition of the EC. The code on anti-dumping measures,
which was agreed during GATT's Kennedy Round (1964-67), has so far
not prevented abuses on the part of importing country governments
(in particular the United States and the EC).- 11 -
ments in countries with persistent and growing deficits in
the balance of payments on current account are frequently tempted
to consider additional import restrictions as an appropriate
means to relieve the situation (instead of a real devaluation
of the currency). In the very short-run, the current account
balance may improve. But in the medium-run it is unlikely that
this happens. The reason is that a chronic current account
deficit, at the given real exchange rate, ultimately reflects
the degree to which domestic investment exceeds domestic saving
and it is not clear at all that a government could, by imposing
restrictions on imports, reduce the level of investment and/or
1
increase the level of savings. Particularly tailor-made import
restrictions are more likely to influence the structure of
domestic expenditures (investment and consumption) rather than
their level.
Another flaw of protectionism is to consider imports as a
source of serious market disruption. In a fundamental sense all
imports which are not complementary to local production disturb
the market position of individual firms and jobs. This is in
the nature of competitive, market-oriented economies, of which
international trade is only one dimension. It is analogous to
the nature of the flow of goods from one region to another
within a particular country. That is, international trade is
commonly the means by which comparative advantages and disadvan-
tages are transmitted between countries. Just as countries or
regions can export best what they can produce cheapest,, they
will import goods that are cheaper than domestic output. When
foreign supplies are cheaper, the exporters normally do not
exert "abnormal" or "unfair" competition, as is so often argued,
but just, exploit their comparative advantage. This comparative
advantage often derives from lower wage costs than those pre-
vailing in the importing countries. If, for instance, our
workers in the textile and clothing industry or in shipbuilding
are to be paid wages amounting to, or exceeding, the national
average, whereas productivity in these industries is lower than
the national average, and if wage costs are several times higher
1See GATT, International Trade 1982/83 (Geneva: GATT, 1983),
pp. 15-17.- 12 -
than abroad as a result, then international competitiveness
cannot be maintained.
The contention that increased manufactured imports from
Japan and the NICs have led to the increasing levels of un-
employment, especially in Western Europe, does not hold
either. In a growing economy, import competition - or for
that matter competition from within - is only one of various
sources of change in employment opportunities. The other
sources are shifts in domestic and foreign demand (exports)
as well as the increase in labour productivity. As a matter
of fact, the last has been by far the most important source
of labour displacement in Western manufacturing industry.
To conclude that productivity should not have increased
would be incorrect. Correct would be to conclude that if
productivity had not increased so much employment would have
decreased even more at given real wages. This even holds for
branches such as textiles, clothing, footwear and leather
products where import penetration from the NICs (and from other
developing countries too) has risen sharply in recent years.
When firms have been driven out of the market, it was often
by the more efficient domestic competitors rather than by
imports (whatever their country of origin).
That import competition initially leads to a loss of
the least viable jobs and industrial capacities, or slows
down their expansion, is only one side of the coin. The counter-
part of this pressure to adjust is the creation of new jobs and
productive capacities in higher productivity lines which embody
more skilled labour and more sophisticated machinery, including
the manufacture of goods being exported to countries in which the
competitive imports originate. It is fallacious to think that
foreign countries (in particular Japan and some NICs) can
supply everything more cheaply than West European or North
American industries can (taking due account of quality differ-
For an overview see OECD, The Impact of the Newly Industria-
lising Countries on Production and Trade in Manufactures
(Paris: OECD, 1979).BibHothek dies Insiitato
fib Weltwirtschaft KIQI
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entials) because in this case they would not export at all.
In fact, most of the industrial countries' foreign trade in
manufactures is of an intra-industry type, i.e. the countries
both export and import very similar goods. In trade relations
with developing countries (as well as with the centrally-planned
economies) inter-industry specialization predominates so that
trade-induced job displacement and job creation takes place in
quite different branches and regions. Yet, even within declining
industries, firms which are not able to compete with imports
co-exist with those which actually do (or could by reducing
costs if it were a matter of survival). Textiles and clothing,
in which product variety was substantially reduced and produc-
tion was sharply up-graded, constitute one example; another is
shipbuilding, in which several medium-sized firms have specialized
on technology-intensive vessels and marine equipment and given up
the production of oil tankers and bulk carriers.
Another misconception lies behind the widespread concern
in the United States and the EC about the persistent and growing
deficit in trade with Japan (as with South Korea and Taiwan).
This has given rise in the United States to feelings about the
need of a new, "aggressive reciprocity" in bilateral trading
arrangements, in the sense that new import barriers are imposed
against a country which is considered to be protectionist itself.
However, in a multilateral trading system bilateral trade balances
are of no economic significance. Moreover, it is doubtful to
assume, as the advocates of the aggressive reciprocity do, that
the Japanese market is more or less closed for foreign suppliers
of manufactures. Indeed, import tariffs in Japan are lower than
in the United States or in the EC and there is in Japan nowadays
much less use of non-tariff measures than ten years ago. It is
For a broad discussion of this issue and of the corresponding
activities of the US Congress see W.R. Cline, "Reciprocity:
A New Approach to World Trade Policy?" In: Cline (ed.), Trade
Policy in the 1980s (Washington/D.C.: Institute for Interna-
tional Economics, 1983), pp. 121-158.Incidentally, the call for
reciprocity aiming at securing a mutually equal market access
would require the western industrial countries to abolish pro-
tective devices against imports from Hong Kong as this country
is really an open economy.- 14 -
possible that the internal retailing system in Japan favours
domestic products in accordance with the customs and attitudes
of the population much more than is the case in the United
States and Western Europe. But there are examples of North
American and European firms making the determined marketing
effort which is required to sell in Japan - and being successful.
A final example of misconception relates to the quest
for protection or subsidies in order to counteract foreign sub-
sidized competition. The point here is that if a foreign country
subsidizes the export of products in which it has a comparative
advantage and the complaining country has a comparative dis-
advantage (take various kinds of clothes, textiles, furniture,
consumer electronics, ships, steel, for instance), the latter
will be better off in welfare terms than it would in the
absence of subsidized foreign supplies, at least as long as the
currency of the subsidizing country does not appreciate. It
should also be noted that the subsidies which foreign govern-
ments grant to their export industries do not necessarily
provide a competitive edge on the world market. Frequently,
and most prominently in LDCs, these subsidies are intended to
neutralize a competitive disadvantage which derives from the
domestic system of import protection and the overvalued
currency.
The advocates of protection usually claim that government
support allows domestic industries to adjust to import compe-
tition more easily. The evidence does not support this notion.
If anything, experience with industry-specific protection has
shown that such "breathing spaces" reduce the incentives to
adjust in an efficient manner. Sooner or later, firms adhering
Despite all talk about Japan's closed market for foreign manu-
factures, recent empirical analyses suggest that the import
intensity of this country corresponds to what might have been
expected of a hypothetical economy of similar natural resource
endowment, capital stock, labour supply and geographical loca-
tion. See S.R. Saxonhouse, "The Micro- and Macroeconomics of
Foreign Sales to Japan", in: W.R. Cline (ed.), Trade Policies
in the 1980s, op. cit., ppo 259-304.- 15 -
to a mere survival-by-protection strategy encounter serious
problems, in some cases (particularly in textiles, clothing,
consumer electronics, steel, shipbuilding) ending in bankrupcy.
Evidently it is an illusion to believe that protection by
itself transforms underlying comparative cost disadvantages
into advantages. This explains why so many protectionist
measures which are announced as temporary have endured
over time.
By the same token, there is no reason to expect that
protective assistance granted to certain industries which
are supposed to have a considerable growth potential (i.e.
technology-intensive industries) could be easily phased out
after some time. If the investment in these industries is a
success, governments of other countries may be prone to
emulate, providing vigorous support now themselves. Attempts
by the forerunners to keep their lead in the so-called growth
industries may founder in retaliatory escalation or competitive
subsidization. If, on the contrary, the industries chosen
for encouragement fail, the government will be made liable
for protecting the capital invested and the jobs created and,
therefore, continue the assistance, which in fact would
become the familiar maintenance assistance.
Ill. The Consequences of Protectionism
The essence of protection, as standard economic theory
shows and empirical evidence confirms, is the distortion in
the allocation of resources, both in a static and a dynamic
sense and nationally as well as worldwide. Selective protec-
tionism has particularly high costs since it delinks economic
development from market conditions and reduces progressively
the structural adaptability of the economy to internal or
external unpredictable opportunities and setbacks. This is- 16 -
also true of those LDCs which overemphasize import substitu-
tion; in general, the protectionist policies serve to favour
more or less systematically the comparatively, less efficient
and less essential industries. The cost-raising argument even
holds if one takes into account that, to some degree, protection-
ist measures have been circumvented in practice by various forms
of legal and illegal actso In the public debate, as I have
indicated earlier, there is the mistaken belief that protec-
tion would suit the needs of the protecting country and
that the benefits outweigh the costs. The international reper-
cussions too often escape attention. By contrast, I am going
to argue that the protecting country suffers most from its
own interventions and that in a global perspective the dangers
of the new protectionism are grave.
1. Domestic_Rep_ercussions
The costs which protection poses on the protecting
countries themselves have various dimensions. On the one
hand, there is a direct increase of the costs to consumers
as domestic prices of both imports and their local substitutes
become more expensive than they would be under free(r) trade
conditions. Particularly the "voluntary" export restraint
agreements in such important sectors as steel, synthetic
fibres, automobiles and textiles are said to embody consider-
able price-raising effects (up to 10 percent on average,
depending on the overall market situation). Hence, protective
devices are regressive in nature and hurt especially low-
income groups in the protecting country. Moreover, they in-
crease the burden placed on the national central banks
committed to price-level stability. In course of time the
protecting country thus runs the risk of having to accept more
recession and, correspondingly, more unemployment whenever- 17 -
inflation has to be curbed.
On the other hand, protection distorts the structure
of production, reduces allocative efficiency and curtails
the growth potential of the country„ As the domestic prices
of the protected goods are raised beyond the level they would
reach in the case of free(r) entry of imports, and relative
to the prices of other (less protected) goods, too much labour,
capital and entrepreneurship is kept in uncompetitive industries.
Factor costs are pushed in an upward direction under these
circumstances, and the national currency becomes overvalued
(other things being the same). Other industries, especially
the export sector which cannot easily pass the protection-
induced higher costs on to foreign buyers, are penalized and
this the more so the higher the elasticity of substitution,
in production and consumption, between import-substitutes and
non-tradeable home goods. The protection thereby acts as a
tax on exports; available evidence suggest that the amount of
the import protection which is shifted through the equilibrium
price adjustment onto the export sector generally range be-
2
tween one-half and two-thirds. This means, for instance, that
when the EC grants protection to the textile and clothing
industries (via the Multi-fibre Arrangement), or to the steel
industry (via cartelization according to the Davignon-Plan),
or to shipbuilding (via subsidies), she in fact is taxing
additionally the manufacturing activities which reveal a com-
parative advantage, such as export-oriented producers of
chemicals, machinery, automobiles and other knowledge-intensive
goods. Similarly, the protectionist trading regimes as applied
The advocates of protective measures try to refute the infla-
tion argument by referring to official statistics which show
that wholesale or retail prices of the protected products
frequently move in a downward direction or rise more slowly
than those of other products. Nowhere is it said, however,
that without protection these prices might have fallen more
or, in the case of an increase, lagged even more behind other
prices.
2
See L.A. Sjaastad and K.W. Clemens, "The Incidence of Protection:
Theory and Measurement", in: Sjaastad, The Free Trade Endeavour
in Latin America, op.cit.- 18 -
in many LDCs also lead to a considerable anti-export bias.
Hence, in order to secure jobs in declining industries,
the creation of new jobs in growth industries is discouraged.
The net effect of an increase of protection may actually
be to reduce the general level of employment. The outcome
for the protecting country is still worse when other
countries retaliate or when their supplies are diverted to
third markets where they compete with the. exports of the
protecting country.
In addition to allocative inefficiencies, sectoral
protectionism has sheltered also X-inefficiencies at the
firm level. Typically, cost-reducing efforts are relaxed
in a restrictive trade policy environment. The management
of the firms does not feel compelled to continuously improve
the internal organization as well as the marketing and
distribution system and to carry out product and process inno-
vations; one may content oneself with a "quiet life"; and
it pays to invest resources in lobbying for protection. No
firm could afford such a behaviour under conditions of
competition - and survive. The accumulation of X-inefficien-
cies generally leads to a situation in which the country
progressively misses the opportunities for exploiting economies
of scale and fails in sharing, or catching up with, techno-
logical advances. The society as a whole is bound to become
impoverished.
Estimates for a number of industrial countries indicate that
the loss in real income for each job saved through protec-
tion is substantially higher than the average annual wage
in the protected industry. The available evidence on LDCs
points into the same direction.- 19 -
2 • l2ternational_Rep_ercussions
Whereas for the socialist countries and the LDCs as
suppliers of manufactured goods the "small country"
assumption holds, large trading units such as the United
States or the EC can influence world market prices and
may,therefore, improve their terms of trade through pro-
tection o The result for the world economy as a whole is
going to resemble a negative-sum game, ioe. the loss
inflicted to the other countries outweighs the gain
accruing to the major countries which pursue protectionist
policieso
Among the losers are many LDCs which typically lack
the (economic and/or political) strength to retaliate
effectively against protectionist devices of the major
trading powers. It is true that most LDCs enjoy trade pre-
ferences in their favour; but it is equally true that the
preferences have always been limited in both scope and
coverage, that there is a myriad of safeguard clauses for the
application of "emergency" protection and that the preferences
have tended to be inversely correlated with the export poten-
tial of the LDCs. Especially sectoral protectionism which
aims at saving jobs in sunset industries in the advanced coun-
tries can prevent LDCs from making full use of their compara-
tive advantage in labour-intensive products.
The most conspicuous example is textiles and clothing,
which for most LDCs represent the first step in the ladder
2
of orientating their industrial sector towards exports. These
See R.J. Langhammer and A. Sapir, "The Economic Impact of
Tariff Preferences", forthcoming as Thames Essay of the
Trade Policy Research Centre, London.
2See D. Keesing and M. Wolf, Textiles Quotas Against Developing
Countries (London: Trade Policy Research Centre, 1980).
- M. Wolf, "Managed Trade in Practice: Imlications of the
Textile Arrangements", in: Cline (ed.), Trade Policy in
the 1980s, op. cit., pp. 455-482.- 20 -
countries are deprived of an important source of foreign
exchange earnings, which narrows their capacity to import
and thus slows down economic growth. At the same time they
import unemployment from the industrial countries. More
generally, these countries may promote, at high domestic
resource costs, exports of goods for which they do not face
trade discrimination because they have a comparative dis-
advantage; or they may sink straight into export pessimism
and feel tempted to pursue inefficient import substitution.
Efforts to improve national economic policies are certainly
undermined. Taiwan, though also hit by the textile protec-
tionism in the West, managed to avoid such mistakes; other
countries did not (as India). It goes without saying that
the increasing sectoral protectionism of industrial countries
against LDCs clashes with the official^commitment of the US
and EC governments to contribute through trade expansion to
economic development in the Third World.
That the LDCs are hurt by the protectionism of the
industrial countries should not obscure the fact that con-
siderable costs emerge also within the OECD area.
- Substantial trade diversion occurs, not only in the sense"
that imports shift from lower- to higher-cost sources,
but also in the sense that the relatively more open
countries become a convenient target for foreign exporters
which face unsurmountable import barriers elsewhere;
the inroads of foreign suppliers of automobiles, consumer
electronics, steel products or textiles, into the West German
market may serve as an illustration.
- Concomitantly to trade diversion there may also be a con-
siderable distortion of international investment patterns.
Faced with increasing sectoral protectionism foreign
exporters are encouraged to substitute capital exports
See the empirical estimates, based on a comparison between West
Germany and Malaysia, by H.H. Glismann and D. Spinanger,
"Employment and Income Effects of Re-locating Textile Indu-
stries", The World Economy, Vol. 5 (1982), pp. 105-109.- 21 -
for commodity exports, so that the shaping of trade
policies, rather than differences in the marginal effi-
ciency of investment, determines the direction and size
of capital flows.
Moreover, sectoral protectionism leads to income trans-
fers among industrial countries and to shifts of the
adjustment burden, which are uncontrollable and have nothing
to do with the strength or weakness of particular economies;
current developments in the policies on agriculture, tex-
tiles, steel or shipbuilding are cases in point.
- All this is bound to lead to trade disputes among govern-
ments, as in fact has been increasingly happening in recent
years. Such disputes absorb scarce resources, not only in
the administrations of the countries involved, but also in
private sectors which lobby for specific government actions.
Much worse, the disputes create an unnecessary and un-
calculable uncertainty for investors, exporters and importers
as it is hard for them to predict the outcome of the
settlement procedures and to assess the risk that govern-
ments resort to retaliation and counterretaliation. An
investment-led revitalization of the industrial economies,
which seems to be particularly urgent in Western Europe,
can be unduly retarded under such circumstances.
Another issue which has to be addressed in this context
refers to the implications for the functioning of the inter-
national financial system. The current discussions about the
sources and the cures of the problem of massive external debt
(both sovereign and corporate debt) which many LDCs and
various East European countries are currently facing revolve
in general around high real rates of interest, world economic
sluggishness, depressed raw material prices, imprudent lending
by the banking system and misdirected economic policies in
the debtor countries (including the accumulation of high- 22 -
public budget deficits). No doubt, these are important causes
of increased international indebtedness; the requisite actions
of dealing with the problem will have to focus on those
causes. It should be noted, however, that protectionist policies
in the industrial countries have compounded the problem.
The industrialized world provides the markets of last resort
for many LDCs. When the access to important buyer markets
is obstructed, it becomes difficult for indebted countries
to achieve an expansion of their export earnings which
keeps pace with their debt-servicing requirements, even if
these countries do reduce aggregate expenditure \ relative to
output and even if they possess an export potential. Although
LDCs should not be expected to run a surplus on current account,
rapidly expanding exports are a necessary condition for re-
gaining and maintaining their capacity to borrow and thereby
promote their economic development. Moreover, although policy
reforms which make for greater economic efficiency have to be
undertaken in the debtor countries in order to get out of. the
financial impasse, the success of such efforts will be under-
mined if at the same time trade opportunities for them are
cut down by protectionist policies in the major creditor
countries. Debt repudiation could become an attractive policy
option in some countries and, once this comes about, it may
even trigger a general destabilization of the world financial
system. These strains should be taken seriously, even allowing
for the fact that the debt-servicing problem would not just
vanish with a reduction of protectionism; and for the fact
that, in case of default by one or more debtors, it would be
technically feasible to avoid a repetition of the world-
wide disaster of the early thirties, as every national central
bank has the power to act as "lender of last resort" to the
domestic banking system.- 23 -
IV. The Prospects for Restoring Open World Markets
From all this it is safe to conclude that the current
protectionist policies and ideas are false remedies to
resolve economic problems; they are short-sighted, counter-
productive and a manifestation of economic nationalism
which already once, in the thirties, led to a disintegration
of the world economy. There is a fundamental misunderstanding
of the impact of restrictive practices on both the protecting
country itself and its trading partners,and international trade
is unnecessarily politicized.
1
Whether or not the trend towards selective protectionism
will continue into the future is impossible to predict. In
all major industrial countries the interaction between the
profit-maximizing behaviour of sectoral interest groups and
the vote-maximizing behaviour of policy makers (and the
aligning behaviour of bureaucrats) has built a producer
bias, rather than a consumer bias, into the political market.
Therefore, there is a danger that new barriers (overtly or
covertly, directly or as a by-product) will be erected if
- the domestic economy does not recover on a sustained basis
and unemployment does not decline strongly;
- market-penetration by foreign suppliers rises too fast
in the price-sensitive labour-intensive products;
- the domestic business community and the labour unions
feel that reciprocity in market-access opportunities is
weak;
- the society is convinced that the strength of the country
requires self-sufficiency in so-called strategic goods
(food, steel, ships) and does, therefore, not accept a
shift of comparative advantage to other countries;
In this connection, see J. Tumlir, "International Economic
Order: Can the Trend Be Reversed?" The World Economy, Vol. 5
(1982), pp. 29-41.- 24 -
- governments commit themselves to promote high-technology
activities and invoke the "infant-industry" argument for
this.
The factors which may stem the protectionist tide in
industrial countries include
- the determination by domestic industries to innovate in
products (manufacturing' new goods which face a high income
elasticity of demand), in processes (lowering costs and
saving non-renewable resources) and in locations
(transferring production to countries where efficiency
wage levels and environmental costs are lower than at
home);
- the strategy of many multinational enterprises to geo-
graphically diversify production in the horizontal and the
vertical direction and to operate with "footloose" sub-
sidiaries;
- the diversification and up-grading of manufactured exports
from highly competitive countries (mainly NICs);
- a progressive liberalization of trade in manufactures
among LDCs;
- the financial constraints imposed by the budget, when
industries are to be assisted via subsidies and similar
Treasury outlays.
What is most required for turning the protectionist-
liberal balance towards liberalism is political leadership,
and the first responsibility lies on the governments of the
major industrial countries (United States, EC, Japan). Some
governments may want to wait until unemployment decreases- 25 -
markedly. But this would be a self-deception, if not just a
pretext for passiveness, because that very sectoral protec-
tionism delays structural adjustment in the industrial coun-
tries and thereby impairs the chances for their economic
revitalization. The case for trade liberalism, therefore,
must be built upon its own merits. As much of the current
protectionism reflects the excessive intervention (however
well-intended) of the state in the domestic economy, it is
now time for western governments to recognize that their
economies, and hence the world economy as a whole, can only
prosper in a framework of open markets with international
competition which, as experience unequivocally has proved
time and again, is the most powerful source of innovation
and productivity growth.
The objective, therefore, must be to arrest and then
reverse selective protectionism and to restore the principle
of multilateral and non-discriminatory trade. Several pro-
posals have been made in the literature to tackle this
objective. A low-track approach is to legitimize existing
protectionist practices through amendments of the GATT and
to renounce the imposition of any further restrictive measures.
However, if existing selective protectionism is legalized, govern-
ments may find it even more difficult than hitherto to resist new
protectionist pressures. In my view, it is time for a high-track
approach, by which all known variants of "organized trade"
are phased out and new ones are prohibited. On the top of the
list for actions, I would like to see firm political commit-
ments that the Multi-fibre Arrangement would not be renewed
once again (in 1986, when the present term expires), that the
many other product-specific export-restraint measures imposed
on foreign suppliers are removed quickly, that subsidies will
be strictly restricted to "infant industry" cases (the burden
of proof being on the aid-demanding sectors) and that national
agricultural policies will allow liberal trade in agricultural
products.- 26 -
The failure of the GATT Ministerial Meeting, held in
November 1982 (the first since 1973), in reaffirming the
rules for a liberal trade order are indeed not encouraging.
But public discussion on central economic issues in some
major countries (such as the United States, the United King-
dom and West Germany) makes evident an increasing perception
that hitherto equity considerations might have been paid
excessive attention at the expense of efficiency, individual
initiative and risk-taking/ that the workers' desire of
employment security might have mistakenly been interpreted
as a right to keep one's particular job, and that government
involvement in the economy might have led to an overregulation
in many fields. This discussion, if it continues, could
enhance the influence of liberal forces in trade policies
too. Moreover, the upswing in demand and production, which
is underway in the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom
and West Germany, among other countries, since mid-1983, should
moderate protectionist pressures in no small degree (despite
the uncertainty over the longevity of the current economic
expansion).
Once there is movement towards liberalization of trade
within a multilateral framework, it will be necessary for
the LDCs to play their part. Their governments should not
insist so much on a "special and differentiated treatment",
as they achieved in the Tokyo Round. Taiwan and other East
Asian countries know quite well that any departure from the
principle of non-discrimination not only allows for pre-
ferences but also for selective discrimination by industrial
countries. What LDCs must recognize is that they also have a
long-term interest in integrating their economies in the
international division of labour, with the concomitant
intensification of trade relation both in north-south and
south-south direction.- 27 -
Especially the NICs should take the lead in dismantling
import protection in a gradual and predictable manner. Some
of the countries (most prominently South Korea and Taiwan)
are no longer labour-surplus economies. Therefore, they should
further diversify out of the simple labour-intensive items,
thereby making room for the laggards within the industrializing
Third World, and they should include in their export assort-
ment more sophisticated, higher-quality products. Several of
the East Asian NICs are already shifting their composition
of output in accordance with their changing comparative
advantage, and Taiwan's determination to set up, in 1980, a
high-technology industrial park (near Hsinchu) is an inter-
esting example of how far-reaching such shifts can attempt
to become over the longer term. The still considerable protec-
tion which some of these countries (including South Korea and
Taiwan) grant to their textiles and other mature industries
does not suit, for reasons discussed earlier, such a forward-
looking pattern; ultimately it plays into the hands of the
advocates of an aggressive reciprocity in the major advanced
countries.
V. Final Remarks
To conclude: there is a mutual interest in strengthening
the functioning of the world trading system based on market
principles. The challenge ahead is to find ways for making
multilateral negotiations more productive. The governments
should not approach them in terms of what has to be conceded
to other countries but rather in terms of the lasting economic
and political advantages which can be reaped for the own
society in the first place. It is for the governments to
inspire confidence in an open world economy. The elaboration
of a programme which is credible and which shows how and
in what time we will get there, would certainly improve
world trade prospects, including the future prospects for
continued economic growth in the Asian-Pacific region.- 28 -
According to various current forecasts by international
organizations, world trade could perhaps expand at an annual
rate of 4 to 5 percent in real terms during the remainder
of this decade, provided that protectionism is not increased.
This would be less than in the healthy fifties and sixties,
but greater than in the troublesome seventies. The world
economy would resume the path of integration, and the NICs
and other LDCs could be expected to increase their participa-
tion in international trade (particularly in manufactures).
But in order to sustain integration it will be essential
for most industrial as well as developing countries to
foster structural adjustment within the domestic economy.
In addressing this task, governments face the challenge of
controlling monetary growth and thereby checking inflation;
of reducing existing structural budget deficits through curtail-
ment of expenditures (including subsidies); of cutting marginal
income tax rates; and of deregulating the product and factor
markets, so that saving and investment is enhanced and the
relative price incentives deriving from government policy
become more suitable to an efficient allocation of resources.
A few industrial countries and some LDCs have already taken
some measures of this nature. They now have to show perseverance
in the effort to bring about the requisite adjustments, while
the other countries plagued with structural rigidities still
face the need to change economic policies fundamentally.